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NOTES & COMMENTS
Manure Management for Climate Change
Mitigation: Regulating CAFO
Greenhouse Gas Emissions
Under the Clean Air Act
KATRINA A. TOMAS*
Climate change is the defining challenge of our time,
which if unbridled, will imperil our communities and the viability of future generations. Efforts to reduce global temperature rise require more than merely reforming carbon dioxide emissions from the energy and transportation sectors.
Notably, climate solutions cannot be reached without simultaneously addressing the more potent methane and nitrous
oxide gases. In the United States, intensive factory farms, legally known as Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations
(“CAFOs”), are responsible for large emissions of these two
greenhouse gases due to manure mismanagement. While
there are no federal environmental regulations in place for
mitigating CAFOs’ climate effects, existing greenhouse gas
frameworks within the Clean Air Act may provide a solution.
This Note analyzes Clean Air Act provisions that allow methane and nitrous oxide regulation and assesses the viability
of applying these statute sections to CAFOs in order to curb
emissions from the livestock sector and mitigate climate impacts.
*
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INTRODUCTION
The main focus of climate policy within the United States centers on reducing fossil fuel consumption.1 However, reducing carbon dioxide emissions from the energy and transportation sector
alone will not mitigate climate change.2 Concentrating emission
modification efforts exclusively within the transportation and energy sectors is insufficient. Currently, methane, nitrous oxide, and
other “non-[carbon dioxide] greenhouse gases contribute a third of

1

See Global Warming Solutions: Reduce Emissions, UNION OF CONCERNED
SCIENTISTS, https://www.ucsusa.org/our-work/global-warming/solutions/globalwarming-solutions-reduce-emissions#.W6ZXAXNKGNU (last visited Sept. 22,
2018).
2
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE
2014 SYNTHESIS REPORT: SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS 17–18 (2014),
https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/02/AR5_SYR_FINAL_SPM.pdf
[hereinafter 2014 SYNTHESIS REPORT].
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total anthropogenic [carbon dioxide] equivalent emissions.”3 Only
with large simultaneous reductions in carbon dioxide and non-carbon dioxide emissions will there be any hope of meeting the 2050
target of limiting global temperature rise to less than two degrees
Celsius set by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(“IPCC”).4
Methane and nitrous oxide are the two most abundant non-carbon dioxide greenhouse gases.5 Because they are more potent and
have shorter atmospheric lifetimes than carbon dioxide, these gases
hold the potential for more rapid reductions in radiative forcing than
would be possible by controlling emissions of carbon dioxide
alone.6 In the United States, agriculture is responsible for about
eighty percent (80%) of nitrous oxide emissions and about thirtyfive percent (35%) of methane emissions.7 The largest source of agricultural greenhouse gas emissions stems from the excretions of animals in the livestock industry.8 Enteric fermentation, which produces methane through the belching and exhalation of ruminants—
mostly cows and sheep in the United States—“is responsible for
32% of all agricultural emissions and 25% of methane emissions in

3

William J. Ripple et al., Commentary: Ruminants, Climate Change and
Climate Policy, NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE, Jan. 2014, at 2, 2.
4
See id.; see also 2014 SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 2, at 17–19; John C.
Dernbach, Creating Legal Pathways to a Zero-Carbon Future, 46 ENVTL. L. REP.
10,780, 10,781 (2016).
5
Ripple et al., supra note 3, at 2; see Overview of Greenhouse Gases: Methane Emissions, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/
ghgemissions/overview-greenhouse-gases#methane (last visited Dec. 29, 2018);
Overview of Greenhouse Gases: Nitrous Oxide Emissions, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/overview-greenhouse-gases#
nitrous-oxide (last visited Dec. 29, 2018).
6
See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE
CHANGE 2007: SYNTHESIS REPORT 36 (2007), https://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr.pdf [hereinafter 2007 SYNTHESIS REPORT].
7
U.S. EPA, EPA 430-R-18-003, INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS
EMISSIONS AND SINKS 1990-2016, at ES-21 (2018) (stating that 25.9% of methane
emissions came from enteric fermentation and 10.3% from manure management)
[hereinafter EPA INVENTORY].
8
Peter Lehner & Nathan A. Rosenberg, Legal Pathways to Carbon-Neutral
Agriculture, 47 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,845, 10,846–48 (2017).
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the United States.”9 Moreover, “[m]anure management activities . . . releas[e] nitrous oxide and methane in quantities that total
16% of total [United States] agricultural emissions.”10
Emissions from both enteric fermentation and manure are a result of intensive factory farms, legally known as Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations (“CAFOs”), that have taken over the modern livestock industry.11 Setting a national framework for methane
and nitrous oxide emissions from CAFOs is paramount. Relying on
states may provide localized standards that will undoubtedly help
mitigation efforts. However, the lack of a federal emission threshold
may cause corporate farms to move production to states with lax
policies, thus creating a deterioration of standards known as a “race
to the bottom.”12
In the United States, national frameworks for environmental
compliance are set through regulations promulgated by the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA” or “Agency”), an administrative
agency.13 The EPA currently regulates carbon-based emissions from

9

Id. at 10,847.
Id.
11
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES): Animal Feeding Operations (AFOs), U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, https://www.epa.
gov/npdes/animal-feeding-operations-afos (last visited Sept. 22, 2018) [hereinafter Animal Feeding Operations]; see JAMES M. MACDONALD & WILLIAM D.
MCBRIDE, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., THE TRANSFORMATION OF U.S. LIVESTOCK AGRICULTURE: SCALE, EFFICIENCY, AND RISKS 3, 5–6, 12 (2009). The image of
America as a mostly agrarian society has been “replaced by vast sheds hulking
over the plains, housing tens of thousands of animals each,” prompting countries
around the world to follow suit in the mass industrialization of animal agriculture.
Fiona Harvey et al., Rise of Mega Farms: How the US Model of Intensive Farming
Is Invading the World, GUARDIAN (July 18, 2017, 11:06 AM), https://www.the
guardian.com/environment/2017/jul/18/rise-of-mega-farms-how-the-us-modelof-intensive-farming-is-invading-the-world.
12
For a discussion on whether environmental regulation should be left to the
states or the federal government, see generally Richard L. Revesz, The Race to
the Bottom and Federal Environmental Regulation: A Response to Critics, 82
MINN. L. REV. 535, 538–540 (1997); Joshua D. Sarnoff, A Reply to Professor
Revesz’s Response in “The Race to the Bottom and Federal Environmental Legislation,” 8 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 295, 296–99 (1998).
13
See, e.g., Overview of the Clean Air Act and Air Pollution, U.S. ENVTL.
PROTECTION AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/air/caa/ (last visited Dec. 29, 2018)
[hereinafter Overview of the Clean Air Act].
10
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cars, coal-fired power plants, and other greenhouse gas emitters under the Clean Air Act (“CAA”) by establishing a national standard
for mitigating the industries’ production of greenhouse gases.14 The
EPA needs to similarly hold the animal agriculture sector accountable by enforcing the existing CAA framework in order to ensure a
decrease in methane and nitrous oxide emissions.
However, there are currently no federal environmental regulations in place for mitigating the livestock industry’s effects on climate change.15 Regulating CAFOs at the federal level under any environmental provision has only seen success through the Clean Water Act (“CWA”)—a statute administered by the EPA—for the purposes of controlling point source pollution into United States waterways.16 Nevertheless, controlling greenhouse gas emissions from
CAFOs is not entirely an impossibility under existing federal environmental laws. Discrete provisions of the CAA—sections 108,
109, and 111—provide opportunities to set national greenhouse gas
emission threshold standards for CAFOs.17
This Note seeks to analyze the CAA provisions that allow methane and nitrous oxide regulation and assess the viability of applying these statute sections to CAFOs. Part I provides background on
the relationship between climate change and animal excretions from
the livestock industry in the United States. Part II discusses the existing regulatory framework that governs CAFOs and greenhouse
gas emissions. It explains that the EPA is empowered to and capable
14

See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 532 (2007); see also 40 C.F.R.
pt. 60 (2018).
15
“From an environmental quality standpoint, much of the interest in animal
agriculture has focused on impacts on water resources,” which has resulted in
regulatory provisions addressing CAFO impacts in the Clean Water Act
(“CWA”). CLAUDIA COPELAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32947, AIR QUALITY ISSUES AND ANIMAL AGRICULTURE: EPA’S AIR COMPLIANCE AGREEMENT 2–
3 (2014) [hereinafter AIR QUALITY ISSUES]. The EPA’s attempts to regulate
CAFOs under the CAA, Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (“CERCLA”), and Emergency Planning and Community
Right-to-Know Act (“EPCRA”) aimed at addressing pollution affecting air quality, rather than climate change. See id.
16
40 C.F.R. § 122.42(e) (promulgated pursuant to the power delegated by 33
U.S.C. § 1342).
17
42 U.S.C. §§ 7408, 7409, 7411 (2012). For purposes of clarity and accuracy, this Note provides citations to the corresponding U.S. Code sections of the
CAA. Short-form citations are also to the U.S. Code sections.
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of regulating CAFOs’ greenhouse gas emissions through the CAA.
Part III concludes by arguing for the application of existing CAA
provisions to CAFOs and explains how to successfully navigate the
legal roadblocks that seemingly prevent regulating CAFOs’ greenhouse gas emissions.
I. ANIMAL AGRICULTURE AND CLIMATE CHANGE
In the United States, the animal agriculture industry has shifted
considerably in recent years towards corporate or factory farms,
known for regulatory purposes as Animal Feeding Operations
(“AFOs”) or Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations (“CAFOs”),
depending on their size.18 The EPA defines CAFOs as any lot or
facility where animals “have been, are, or will be stabled or confined
and fed or maintained for a total of 45 days or more in any 12-month
period,” and where “crops, vegetation, forage growth, or post-harvest residues are not sustained in the normal growing season.”19 In
effect, CAFOs “congregate animals, feed, manure, dead animals,
and production operations on a small land area.”20 Currently, over
ten billion food animals are raised and slaughtered every year in the
United States alone.21
Admittedly, the industrialization of animal agriculture has made
the industry more efficient and has consequently lowered consumer
costs of animal products.22 However, these gains come with serious

18

See 40 C.F.R. § 122.23(b)(1)–(2); MACDONALD & MCBRIDE, supra note
11 (analyzing the major shift toward large-scale industrialized production systems
in the U.S. livestock industry).
19
40 C.F.R. § 122.23(b)(1)(i).
20
Clean Water Act’s National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
(NPDES) Program for Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations (CAFOs), U.S.
ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/agriculture/agricultural-animal-production, (last visited Dec. 14, 2018) [hereinafter NPDES for CAFOs]; see
also Animal Feeding Operations, supra note 11.
21
Michelle Buckley, Comment, This Waiting Game Stinks: The Lack of EPA
Progress in Regulating Air Emissions from Animal Agriculture, 2 ARIZ. J. ENVTL.
L. & POL’Y 1, 1 (2011).
22
See MACDONALD & MCBRIDE, supra note 11, at 2. (“New technologies
often reduce costs directly, by allowing more meat and milk to be produced for a
given amount of land, feed, labor, and capital. . . . [L]ower industrywide farm
costs lead to lower prices for farm commodities.”).
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externalities, such as harm to animal welfare23 and antibiotic resistance as a result of routine use on animals.24 Additionally, because of large scale productions, rural communities and low-income
communities of color disproportionately suffer and are forced to
deal directly with catastrophic air and water pollution.25
Due to the number of animals raised in these facilities, CAFOs
produce massive volumes of waste.26 Under traditional agricultural
practices, animal waste is deposited throughout the environments
the livestock forage.27 However, animals within CAFOs do not
graze in pastures and are confined in anywhere from three to thirty
buildings with slated cement floors, which allow the animal waste
to collect in holding areas under the buildings.28 Animal waste is
abundant in these types of operations: one dairy farm with 2,500
cows produces as much waste as a city with around 411,000 residents.29
Depending on the design of the CAFO, waste is either left in the
pit beneath the building for months or flushed out with water
23
See Lindsay Walton & Kristen King Jaiven, Regulating Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations for the Well-Being of Farm Animals, Consumers, and
the Environment, in WHAT CAN ANIMAL LAW LEARN FROM ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW? 89, 93 (Randall Abate ed., 2015).
24
Ellen K. Silbergeld et al., Industrial Food Animal Production, Antimicrobial Resistance, and Human Health, 29 ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH 151, 161–63
(2008); David Tillman et al., Agricultural Sustainability and Intensive Production
Practices, 418 NATURE 671, 674 (2002).
25
See, e.g., Carole Levine, Environmental Justice or Environmental Racism:
Something Smells in North Carolina, NPQ (June 7, 2018), https://nonprofitquarterly.org/2018/06/07/environmental-justice-or-environmental-racism-somethingsmells-in-north-carolina/; Steve Wing & Susanne Wolf, Intensive Livestock Operations, Health, and Quality of Life Among Eastern North Carolina Residents,
108 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 233, 235–37 (2000).
26
See John Verheul, Student Article, Methane as a Greenhouse Gas: Why
the EPA Should Regulate Emissions from Animal Feeding Operations and Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations Under the Clean Air Act, 51 NAT. RESOURCES J. 163, 168 (2011).
27
Susan M. Brehm, Comment, From Red Barn to Facility: Changing Environmental Liability to Fit the Changing Structure of Livestock Production, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 797, 809 (2005).
28
Id. at 808–09.
29
EDWIN BARTH ET AL., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, RISK MANAGEMENT
EVALUATION FOR CONCENTRATED ANIMAL FEEDING OPERATIONS 7 (John Haines
& Laurel Staley eds., 2004).
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throughout the day.30 Because it can be difficult for land to absorb
such high concentrations of animal waste, the waste on CAFOs is
instead pumped into open-air retention ponds, known as waste storage lagoons, some of which can be as large as eight acres.31 Liquid
manure is stored in lagoons until land becomes available on which
to spread the waste.32 “When manure is left as a solid . . . on . . . pasture lands, it typically decomposes aerobically and produces little to
no methane.”33 However, when waste is stored or handled in a system that creates an anaerobic environment, such as the lagoons, the
waste releases amounts of methane that are as much as ninety percent (90%) higher than those in grazing systems.34
Ruminant production is the largest source of global anthropogenic methane emissions and is responsible for 25.9% of methane
emissions in the United States.35 Ruminant animals are herbivores
that digest their food through the process of enteric fermentation in
a multi-chambered stomach.36 Cows and sheep are the highest produced ruminants in the United States.37 Methane is produced as a

30

See CARRIE HRIBAR, NAT’L ASS’N OF LOCAL BDS. OF HEALTH, UNDERSTANDING CONCENTRATED ANIMAL FEEDING OPERATIONS AND THEIR IMPACT ON
COMMUNITIES 3 (Mark Schultz ed., 2010).
31
See ROBBIN MARKS, NATURAL RESOURCE DEFENSE COUNCIL AND THE
CLEAN WATER NETWORK CESSPOOLS OF SHAME: HOW FACTORY FARM LAGOONS
AND SPRAYFIELDS THREATEN ENVIRONMENTAL AND PUBLIC HEALTH 36 (2001).

32
See id. While waste absorbed on land does not emit as many greenhouse
gases, it often leads to a host of other environmental concerns—namely the contamination of groundwater, the spread of airborne diseases, and noxious fumes
that disproportionately affect the poor communities surrounding CAFOs. See
DOUG GURIAN-SHERMAN, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, CAFOS UNCOVERED: THE UNTOLD COSTS OF CONFINED ANIMAL FEEDING OPERATIONS 3–5
(2008).
33
Lehner & Rosenberg, supra note 8, at 10,855.
34
Paul Jun et al., CH4 and N2O Emissions from Livestock Manure, in NAT’L
GREENHOUSE GAS INVENTORIES PROGRAMME, INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON
CLIMATE CHANGE, BACKGROUND PAPERS – IPCC EXPERT MEETINGS ON GOOD
PRACTICE GUIDANCE AND UNCERTAINTY MANAGEMENT IN NAT’L GREENHOUSE
GAS INVENTORIES 321, 338 tbl.10 (Buendia et al. eds., 2002).
35
Ripple et al., supra note 3, at 2. Enteric fermentation (which results from
ruminant production) is responsible for 25.9% of methane emissions in the United
States. EPA INVENTORY, supra note 7, at ES-21.
36
Ripple et al., supra note 3, at 2.
37
Lehner & Rosenberg, supra note 8, at 10,847.
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by-product of microbial digestive processes in these animals, and is
released through belching and breathing.38
It is estimated that there are more than 18,000 CAFOs and
450,000 AFOs in the United States.39 Unsurprisingly, these industrial facilities emit significant amounts of greenhouse gases like methane and nitrous oxide.40 Greenhouse gases absorb infrared radiation from the sun as it reflects off the Earth’s surface, trapping the
heat in the atmosphere.41 Human activities increased the concentration of greenhouse gas emissions in the Earth’s atmosphere, causing
global climate change.42
Greenhouse gases vary in their warming influence on the climate
system due to their different radiative properties and lifetimes in the
atmosphere.43 These warming influences are often expressed
through a common metric based on the radiative property of carbon
dioxide.44 Therefore, while carbon dioxide may be the most prevalent of the greenhouse gases, and often the focus of climate change
concern, it is by no means the most potent gas.45 Illustratively, nitrous oxide has a global warming potential 265–298 times that of
carbon dioxide on a 100-year frame.46 Nitrous oxide emissions will

38

Id.; Ripple et al., supra note 3, at 2.
RICHARD JONES ET AL., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, REPORT NO. 17-P0396, ELEVEN YEARS AFTER AGREEMENT, EPA HAS NOT DEVELOPED RELIABLE
EMISSION ESTIMATION METHODS TO DETERMINE WHETHER ANIMAL FEEDING OPERATIONS COMPLY WITH CLEAN AIR ACT AND OTHER STATUTES 1 (2017).
40
See EPA INVENTORY, supra note 7, at ES-21.
41
Glossary of Climate Change Terms, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY,
https://19january2017snapshot.epa.gov/climatechange/glossary-climate-changeterms_.html#G (last visited Dec. 29, 2018) (definitions of “Greenhouse Effect”
and “Greenhouse Gas (GHG)”).
42
See 2007 SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 6, at 36.
43
Id.
44
Id.
45
Ripple et al., supra note 3, at 2.
46
Greenhouse Gas Emissions: Understanding Global Warming Potentials,
U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/understanding-global-warming-potentials (last visited Dec. 14, 2018) [hereinafter Understanding Global Warming Potentials]; see also Carbon Brief & Duncan Clark,
How Long Do Greenhouse Gases Stay in the Air?, GUARDIAN (Jan. 16, 2012, 2:00
AM), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2012/jan/16/greenhouse-gasesremain-air [hereinafter Greenhouse Gases].
39
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also be the primary cause of stratospheric ozone destruction this century.47 Similarly damaging, methane has a global warming potential
that is 28–36 times that of carbon dioxide over a 100-year frame.48
Further, the atmospheric lifespan of methane and nitrous oxide is
about 12 years and about 114 years respectively, compared to the
20–200 year lifespan of carbon dioxide.49 Therefore, decreasing methane and nitrous oxide, rather than carbon dioxide, will potentially
result in more rapid reductions in climate forcing.50
According to the EPA’s national greenhouse gas emissions annual inventory, agriculture represents 8.6% of the nation’s total
greenhouse gas emissions and 76.7% of its nitrous oxide emissions.51 Additionally, the EPA states that methane emissions from
enteric fermentation and manure management represent 25.9% and
10.3% of total methane emissions, respectively.52 Methane and nitrous oxide compose 10% and 6%, respectively, of total greenhouse
gas emissions in the United States.53 Undeniably, animal agriculture, representing less than 1% of the national GDP, contributes significantly to climate change.54
The modern structure of the livestock industry, specifically the
current waste storage system, is responsible for animal agriculture’s
47

See R. W. Portmann et al., Stratospheric Ozone Depletion Due to Nitrous
Oxide: Influences of Other Gases, 367 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y B
1256, 1263 (2012).
48
Understanding Global Warming Potentials, supra note 46.
49
Greenhouse Gases, supra note 46.
50
Id. Climate forcing is defined as “the change in radiant energy retained by
Earth owing to emissions of long-lived greenhouse gases.” Ripple et al., supra
note 3, at 2.
51
EPA INVENTORY, supra note 7, at 5-1.
52
Id.
53
Overview of Greenhouse Gases, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY,
https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/overview-greenhouse-gases (last visited Dec.
29, 2018).
54
According to the Economic Research Service, the output of America’s
farms contributed about one percent (1%) of GDP. Because animal agriculture, is
only a percentage of this total farm output, its contribution to the GDP would be
less than one percent (1%). See Ag and Food Sectors and the Economy, U.S.
DEP’T OF AGRIC.: ECON. RES. SERV., https://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/agand-food-statistics-charting-the-essentials/ag-and-food-sectors-and-the-economy/ (last visited Dec. 14, 2018). For the full report, see ECON. RESEARCH SERV.,
U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., NO. 078, AG AND FOOD STATISTICS: CHARTING THE ESSENTIALS, OCTOBER 2017 (2017).
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disproportionate contribution to greenhouse gas emissions. Confining liquid waste in open-air lagoons promotes the decomposition of
livestock manure under anaerobic conditions, which accelerates the
production of methane.55 Furthermore, these waste lagoons contribute to nitrous oxide emissions by facilitating the nitrification-denitrification process: “Nitrification occurs aerobically and converts
[the nitrogen in manure, ammonia,] into nitrate, while denitrification
occurs anaerobically, and converts the nitrate to [nitrous oxide].”56
In 2016, the total agricultural emissions of primarily carbon dioxide, nitrous oxide, and methane in the United States amounted to
about 560 million metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalent.57 The
alarming amount of emissions from CAFOs amidst the rising concerns of climate change’s deleterious global effects demand heightened environmental regulations at the federal level under the CAA.
II. ESTABLISHING THE EPA’S AUTHORITY OVER CAFOS UNDER
THE CAA
A. An Introduction: The EPA and the CAA
Since its adoption in 1963, the CAA has been implemented by
the United States government for the regulation of airborne pollutants.58 The CAA is administered by the EPA, the federal agency
tasked with the enforcement and implementation of federal environmental statutes.59 Under the CAA, the EPA can use an endangerment finding to classify a specific substance as a “pollutant” once
scientific evidence is presented concerning the substance’s harmful

55

See Jun et al., supra note 34, at 322.
Id. at 323.
57
EPA INVENTORY, supra note 7, at 5-1.
58
Clean Air Act, Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392 (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q (2012)).
59
See Overview of the Clean Air Act, supra note 13.
56
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effects.60 Subsequently upon classification, the EPA is able to regulate the pollutant’s release into the atmosphere.61 In effect, the EPA
establishes threshold emission standards under the CAA for regulated entities.
As this Note explains, the EPA is empowered to use the CAA to
regulate greenhouse gases.62 Consequently, the EPA classified methane and nitrous oxide as pollutants.63 As large emitters of these
gases, CAFOs should be subject to CAA regulations because federal
oversight by the EPA would allow for the establishment of a national threshold emission standard for these livestock facilities.
While relying on states’ air pollution statutes may provide localized
standards that will undoubtedly help climate change mitigation efforts, it could nevertheless instigate a race to the bottom among corporate farms, who may decide to move their CAFOs to states with
more lenient emission regulations.
The EPA regulates carbon-based emissions from cars, coal-fired
power plants, and other greenhouse gas emitters under the CAA by
establishing a national standard for mitigating the industries’ production of greenhouse gases.64 The EPA needs to similarly hold the
animal agriculture industry accountable by enforcing the existing
CAA framework against CAFOs in order to ensure a decrease in
methane and nitrous oxide emissions across the livestock sector. The
EPA has the power through the CAA to implement a national greenhouse gas emission threshold for the animal agriculture industry, ensuring compliance by all CAFOs in the United States.
60

The CAA authorizes the EPA to regulate “air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.” 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1).
Through this expressed authority from Congress, the EPA is able to issue endangerment findings supported by scientific evidence. For a climate-specific explanation of the EPA’s regulatory authority to initiate endangerment findings under
the CAA see, NAT. RES. DEF. COUNCIL, EPA’S ENDANGERMENT FINDING: THE
LEGAL AND SCIENTIFIC FOUNDATION FOR CLIMATE ACTION (2017).
61
See Verheul, supra note 26, at 165.
62
See infra Section III.C.
63
John M. Broder, E.P.A. Clears Way for Greenhouse Gas Rules, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 17, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/18/science/earth/18endanger.html.
64
See 40 C.F.R. pt. 60 (2018); see also Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497,
506, 532 (2007) (determining that “greenhouse gases fit well within the [CAA]’s
capacious definition of ‘air pollutant,’” thus granting the EPA authority to regulate carbon-based emissions from various sources).
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B. The Regulatory Framework
The EPA has yet to issue formalized regulations specifically addressing CAFO emissions of methane and nitrous oxide. Thus, relying on the existing CAA framework is paramount.65 No efforts have
been made by the EPA to pass explicit air standards for CAFOs, and
experts suggest regulations tailored specifically to CAFO greenhouse gas emissions are unlikely.66 In fact, explicit federal regulation aimed at protecting environmental quality from CAFO production only concerns the facilities’ impacts on water resources.67 The
improper storage of animal waste “can harm water quality through
surface runoff, direct discharges, spills, and leaching into soil and
groundwater.”68 While environmental regulations of CAFOs can be
seen explicitly carved out in the CWA, the little leverage the act
provides has been difficult to successfully solidify.69
The CWA authorizes the EPA to directly regulate the discharge
of a pollutant from any point source by requiring such a source to
obtain a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
(“NPDES”) permit.70 In 2003, the EPA attempted to issue specific
effluent limitation guidelines for CAFOs,71 which required an
NPDES permit application unless the facility demonstrated there
was no potential for discharge.72 However, the Second Circuit struck

65

Bruce Myers & Linda Breggin, Tackling the Problem of CAFOs and Climate Change: A New Path to Improved Animal Welfare?, in WHAT CAN ANIMAL
LAW LEARN FROM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW? 117, 130–31 (Randall S. Abate ed.,
2015).
66
Id.
67
AIR QUALITY ISSUES, supra note 15, at 2.
68
Id.
69
See Verheul, supra note 26, at 165.
70
40 C.F.R. § 122.45 (2018) (concerning calculation of NPDES permit conditions).
71
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Permit Regulation and
Effluent Limitation Guidelines and Standards for Concentrated Animal Feeding
Operations (CAFOs), 68 Fed. Reg. 7176 (Feb. 12, 2003) (to be codified at 40
C.F.R. pts. 9, 122, 123 & 412).
72
Id. at 7202–03 (“[A]n unpermitted CAFO that does in fact discharge pollutants to waters of the U.S., with or without a determination of ‘no potential to
discharge,’ would be in violation of the Clean Water Act.”) (codified at 40 C.F.R.
§ 122.23(d)(1)–(2) (2003), invalidated by Waterkeeper All., Inc. v. EPA, 399 F.3d
486, 505 (2d Cir. 2005)).
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down the 2003 rule’s mandatory permit requirement because it extended beyond the statutory scope of the CWA, which merely authorizes, rather than mandates, the EPA to regulate the discharge of
pollutants.73 Following the decision, the EPA revised their rule with
more lenient requirements.74 Unfortunately, and perhaps unsurprisingly, this revised rule was similarly struck down by the Fifth Circuit, because imposing liability for facilities merely proposing to
discharge pollutants would still be an unlawful extension of the
CWA.75 Both cases emphasize the EPA’s limited authority to regulate CAFOs through the CWA.76
These CWA decisions will not pose problems for CAFO regulation through the CAA because the CAA provides a number of regulatory tools to address air pollution problems created by CAFOs
through an already existing framework. As statutes, the CWA and
the CAA are similar in their grant of authority because they both
empower the EPA to set threshold standards for pollutant emissions.77 However, in both the CWA cases discussed above, the
courts’ issue surrounded the EPA’s proposed rules, which expanded

73

Waterkeeper, 399 F.3d at 505 (citing Nat. Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 859
F.2d 156, 170 (D.C. Cir. 1988)).
74
Revised National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Permit Regulation and Effluent Limitation Guidelines for Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations in Response to the Waterkeeper Decision, 73 Fed. Reg. 70,418, 70,427
(Nov. 20, 2008) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9, 122, 412) (“EPA is requiring
CAFOs to seek permit coverage if they discharge or propose to discharge pollutants . . . .”) (emphasis added).
75
Nat’l Pork Producers Council v. EPA, 635 F.3d 738, 751 (5th Cir. 2011)
(“[T]he EPA’s authority is limited to the regulation of CAFOs that discharge.”).
76
National Pork Producers Council relied heavily on the analysis presented
in Waterkeeper, and ultimately struck down the requirement provision of the revised rule under a similar analysis: “Because the issues presented in Waterkeeper
are similar to the issues presented here, we find the Second Circuit analysis to be
instructive and persuasive.” Id. at 750. “These cases leave no doubt that there must
be an actual discharge into navigable waters to trigger the CWA’s requirements
and the EPA’s authority.” Id. at 751.
77
Robinson Meyer, How the U.S. Protects the Environment, from Nixon to
Trump, ATLANTIC (Mar. 29, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive
/2017/03/how-the-epa-and-us-environmental-law-works-a-civics-guide-pruitttrump/521001/ (describing how both the CAA and the CWA give the EPA authority to set standards for “what kinds of toxic air pollutants can be released” and
“what pollutants can be released into lakes, streams, and rivers”).
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the scope of the CWA unlawfully.78 Here, adequately regulating
CAFOs’ emissions of greenhouse gases would not require an expansion of already delineated authority. The CAA can be utilized to empower the EPA to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from CAFOs
through sections 108, 109, and 111 of the statute.79 Most significantly, the EPA can use the existing CAA provisions to regulate
CAFO emissions of methane and nitrous oxide, ultimately creating
a national framework by setting an emission threshold for all CAFO
facilities nationwide.
C. Greenhouse Gases Under the CAA
The CAA, originally enacted in 1963 but further developed in
subsequent amendments, regulates ambient air quality, stationary
mobile source emissions, and hazardous air pollutants through the
administration of permits.80 The CAA establishes two provisions
under which the EPA may grant permits: (1) the preconstruction permits, known as New Source Review, under Title I, Parts C and D,
and (2) the operating permit under Title V.81 Through these provisions, the EPA is able to provide permits for polluters, and thus require a threshold emission standard.82

78

See Nat’l Pork Producers Council, 635 F.3d at 749, 751; Waterkeeper, 399
F.3d at 506, 519, 524.
79
See infra Part IV.
80
See Clean Air Act Overview: Evolution of the Clean Air Act, U.S. ENVTL.
PROTECTION AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/clean-air-act-overview/evolutionclean-air-act (last visited Dec. 16, 2018).
81
42 U.S.C. §§ 7475, 7503, 7661 (2012); see U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
FACT SHEET: NEW SOURCE REVIEW (NSR) (2015), https://www.epa.gov/sites/
production/files/2015-12/documents/nsrbasicsfactsheet103106.pdf [hereinafter
FACT SHEET: NEW SOURCE REVIEW].
82
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7475, 7503, 7661; CLAUDIA COPELAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33632, CLEAN AIR PERMITTING: IMPLEMENTATION AND ISSUES
1 (2016) [hereinafter CLEAN AIR PERMITTING] (describing Congress’ intent in
adopting the operating permit programs, which includes the “clarification of pollution control requirements, simplification of procedures for modifying a source’s
control obligations, . . . and enhancing states’ ability to administer other significant CAA responsibilities”); FACT SHEET: NEW SOURCE REVIEW, supra note 81
(“New Source Review . . . requires industrial facilities to install modern pollution
control equipment when they are built or when making a change that increases
emissions significantly,” by requiring owners and operators to obtain permits
“limiting air emissions before they begin construction”).
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The preconstruction permit provision applies to new sources or
the modification of existing sources that emit a threshold level of
pollutants.83 The Title V Operating Permits Program created
through the 1990 CAA amendments, expanded the number of
sources requiring federal permits by “stipulating that all major pollution sources and other designated sources must obtain operating
permits . . . to ensure compliance with the CAA.”84 Prior to the 1990
amendments, existing sources would require permits only if they
were subsequently modified and increased their air emissions.85
This is significant in the CAFO context because pursuant to the 1990
amendments, existing CAFOs—not just new or modified facilities—could be subject to CAA permits.
At the time of the CAA’s initial drafting, climate change was not
the environmental movement’s top policy priority. However, as the
Supreme Court identified in Massachusetts v. EPA, the landmark
2007 decision affirming the EPA’s ability to regulate greenhouse
gases, “[w]hile the Congresses that drafted [the CAA] might not
have appreciated the possibility that burning fossil fuels could lead
to global warming, they did understand that without regulatory flexibility, changing circumstances . . . would soon render the . . . Act
obsolete.”86 Therefore, despite the Act’s expansion and development across the years, the statute has maintained a flexibility that
welcomes interconnections between its provisions to create new policy regimes.
In Massachusetts, the Court determined unambiguously that
greenhouse gases can be air pollutants under the CAA.87 In its holding, the Court ordered the EPA to determine whether emissions of
greenhouse gases “may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.”88 In 2009, the EPA administrator issued its
endangerment finding asserting that the current and projected con-

83

42 U.S.C. § 7475; FACT SHEET: NEW SOURCE REVIEW, supra note 81.
CLEAN AIR PERMITTING, supra note 82, at 1.
85
Id.
86
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 532 (2007).
87
Id. (“Because greenhouse gases fit well within the [CAA’s] capacious definition of ‘air pollutant,’ we hold that EPA has the statutory authority to regulate
the emission of such gases . . . .”).
88
Id. at 532–33 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1)).
84
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centrations of greenhouse gases—including methane and nitrous oxide—threaten existing and future generations.89 The final rule was
published in the federal register at the end of 2009 and made effective in 2010.90 An endangerment finding is a prerequisite for the applicability of most sections of the CAA.91 The EPA thus has the authority to list and regulate methane and nitrous oxide as pollutants
under the CAA.92
However, agricultural operations have long been exempt from
many provisions of environmental laws, and it may appear that regulating CAFO air emissions through the CAA may fall through a
similar loophole.93 Following “the first Agricultural Adjustment Act
of 1933, Congress and the courts . . . built a safety net of statutory
exclusions and economic subsidies”94 to support industrialized animal production, a practice known as “agricultural exceptionalism.”95 Agricultural exceptionalism is premised on the idea that the

89

Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases
Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,495, 66,516 (Dec. 15,
2009) (“The Administrator finds that the air pollution is the combined mix of six
key directly-emitted, long-lived and well-mixed greenhouse gases . . . , which
together, constitute the root cause of human-induced climate change . . . . These
six greenhouse gases are carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons, and sulfur hexafluoride.”); U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS: ENDANGERMENT AND CAUSE OR CONTRIBUTE
FINDINGS FOR GREENHOUSE GASES UNDER SECTION 202(A) OF THE CLEAN AIR
ACT, https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/endangerment-and-cause-or-contributefindings-greenhouse-gases-under-section-202a-clean (last visited Jan. 26, 2019).
90
See Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse
Gases Under section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. at 66,546.
91
42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(1)(A).
92
Pursuant to the finding, the EPA must list all six greenhouse gases as pollutants under preconstruction and operating permit requirements as well as issue
air quality criteria for each of the greenhouse gases identified in the endangerment
finding within 12 months of listing them. Id. § 7408(a)(1)–(2).
93
See, e.g., Kael K. Bowling, Old MacDonald Had a Right to Farm: Putting
a Humane Twist on Missouri’s Right-to-Farm Amendment, 22 DRAKE J. AGRIC.
L. 137, 139 (2017); Jason Foscolo & Michael Zimmerman, Alternative Growth:
Forsaking the False Economies of Industrial Agriculture, 25 FORDHAM ENVTL.
L. REV. 316, 321–27 (2014).
94
Foscolo & Zimmerman, supra note 93, at 316.
95
“Agriculture receives many exceptions or exemptions in labor, bankruptcy,
and antitrust laws.” Bowling, supra note 93, at 139. Federal insurance programs
cover crop losses due to natural disasters, and farmers have their own bankruptcy
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importance of food for human survival should entitle the agriculture
industry to a “special legal and regulatory advantage.”96 Born alongside the modern environmental movement, agricultural exceptionalism has lead policymakers to concede to agricultural interest against
competing environmental concerns, which has riddled federal environmental statutes with multiple farm and agriculture related concessions.97
An example of such a carve-out includes the farm exemptions
that perforate the CWA’s prohibition against discharge pollutants.
Although agricultural waste directly discharged into water is a pollutant under the CWA,98 “other provisions of the statute put discharges of agricultural wastewater, stormwater, and fill material
largely beyond regulatory reach.”99 In the context of mitigating climate change through the regulation of CAFOs’ greenhouse gas
emissions, farms do not benefit from any express exemptions in the
CAA like they do under the CWA.100 Nevertheless, in practice,
agreements between the EPA and the livestock sector may potentially allow CAFOs to bypass CAA regulations with regards to
greenhouse gas emissions.

code. Foscolo & Zimmerman, supra note 93, at 316–17. Further, the agriculture
sector is exempt from anti-trust laws in the Capper-Volstead Act. Id.
96
Foscolo & Zimmerman, supra note 93, at 316; see Susan A. Schneider, A
Reconsideration of Agricultural Law: A Call for the Law of Food, Farming, and
Sustainability, 34 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 935, 935–36 (2010).
97
Foscolo & Zimmerman, supra note 93, at 317 (“Yet rather than reach a
middle ground that balanced agriculture and environmental conservation, policymakers largely yielded to agricultural exceptionalism—nearly every major federal
environmental statute passed since the 1970s has included carve-outs for farms.”).
Congress, and states following the federal government’s example, have largely
prevented the intersection of environmental regulation onto farming practices:
“farms remained largely unburdened by environmental law, yet move steadily up
the ranks of the worst threats to the environment.” J.B. Ruhl, Farms, Their Environmental Harms, and Environmental Law, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 263, 267–68
(2000).
98
33 U.S.C. § 1362(6) (2012).
99
See Ruhl, supra note 97, at 293–94.
100
Id. at 305.
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D. Potential Barriers to the EPA’s Authority:
The Air Compliance Agreement
A potential impediment to the EPA’s authority over CAFOs via
CAA regulations is the Air Compliance Agreement, under which the
EPA compromised some of its ability to regulate animal agriculture
from 2005 onward.101 This Agreement allowed the EPA to provide
CAFOs and AFOs temporary immunity from civil liability under the
CAA’s permit provisions—Title I, Parts C and D, and Title V—in
exchange for CAFOs allowing the EPA to monitor emissions at selected facilities.102 The immunity would extend as long as the monitoring study was in place and would protect CAFOs from being
held liable for violations of the CAA, the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (“CERCLA”),
and the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act
(“EPCRA”).103
While the Air Compliance Agreement created an immunity rather than an exemption, the Agreement provided a “sweeping liability shield for violations of environmental laws,” which made regulation of CAFOs who signed the agreement impossible.104 Of the
nearly 2,681 CAFOs that signed agreements with the EPA, only
twenty-five were selected to participate in monitoring, but all who
signed up were protected by the EPA’s covenant not to sue.105 Without the power to civilly sue CAFOs, the EPA would not be able to
enforce regulations unless there was a criminal violation.106 Further,
“hindered by a lack of adequate, accurate, scientifically credible
data,” the EPA argued it could not establish emission thresholds for
its permits, thus leaving the industry without a standard to even potentially violate.107
101

Animal Feeding Operations Consent Agreement and Final Order, 70 Fed.
Reg. 4958 (Jan. 31, 2005).
102
Id. at 4963. Paragraph 26 details the EPA’s release of covenants not to sue
with respect to certain Emission Units located at participating farms. Id.
103
Id. at 4962 (“[T]his agreement resolves Respondent’s civil liability for certain potential violations of the [CAA], CERCLA and/or EPCRA at [Participating
Company’s] Farm(s) . . . .”).
104
AIR QUALITY ISSUES, supra note 15, at Summary.
105
See id. at 4, 7, 10.
106
Animal Feeding Operations Consent Agreement and Final Order, supra
note 101, at 4958–59.
107
AIR QUALITY ISSUES, supra note 15, at 3.
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The goal of the Agreement, therefore, was in part “to generate
scientifically credible data to provide for the characterization of
emissions from all major types of AFOs.”108 Enforcement of federal
environmental laws, including the CAA, requires accurate measurement of emissions to determine whether regulated pollutants are
emitted in quantities that exceed specified thresholds.109 The EPA,
however, believed that existing data provided a poor basis for regulating and managing air emissions from CAFOs.110
Environmentalists, along with state and local air quality officials, criticized the Agreement, contending that it would unfairly
shield participating producers while placing thousands of communities at risk.111 Further, because only twenty-five farms in ten states
would be monitored, critics argued that it was too limited in scope
to satisfy its objective of determining scientifically credible emission estimates.112 A legal challenge to the Air Compliance Agreement was brought by several environmental groups, although it was
dismissed when the D.C. Circuit held that the agreements constitute
discretionary agency action not reviewable by the court.113 Further,
three years after initiating the study, it was still unclear whether the
EPA would acquire the necessary information to develop emission
protocols because the monitoring study did not include the recommended animal and geographic regional pairings or provide an adequate sample size.114
108

Animal Feeding Operations Consent Agreement and Final Order, supra
note 101, at 4960.
109
See id. (“The purpose of the monitoring study is to: collect data and aggregate it with appropriate existing emissions data; analyze the monitoring results;
and create tools . . . that AFOs could use to determine whether they emit pollutants
at levels that require them to apply for permits under the CAA or submit notifications under CERCLA or EPCRA.”).
110
See AIR QUALITY ISSUES, supra note 15, at 3.
111
John Heilprin, Environmentalists Blast Agriculture Plan, MRT (May 5,
2003, 7:00 PM), https://www.mrt.com/news/article/Environmentalists-Blast-Agriculture-Plan-7918515.php.
112
AIR QUALITY ISSUES, supra note 15, at 7.
113
Ass’n of Irritated Residents v. EPA, 494 F.3d 1027, 1030–31 (D.C. Cir.
2007) (stating that the “analysis of this case begins and ends with subject matter
jurisdiction”).
114
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-944, CONCENTRATED ANIMAL FEEDING OPERATIONS: EPA NEEDS MORE INFORMATION AND A CLEARLY
DEFINED STRATEGY TO PROTECT AIR AND WATER QUALITY FROM POLLUTANTS
OF CONCERN 1, 37–39 (2008), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08944.pdf.
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Despite providing a “safe harbor” provision from civil enforcement of permitting requirements under the CAA, the EPA retained
the authority to criminally prosecute CAFOs and respond to imminent and substantial endangerments to public health or the environment.115 Moreover, the Agreement only specifically exempted
CAFOs from civil violations from volatile organic compounds
(“VOCs”),116 hydrogen sulfide, particulate matter, and ammonia.117
The language in the Agreement explicitly states that the EPA’s releases and covenant not to sue do not extend to emissions of gases
beyond the four named.118 Importantly, none of the four named
gases are greenhouse gases; therefore, it is clear that methane, carbon dioxide, and nitrous oxide were not contemplated in the Agreement.
As the EPA did not cede its ability to regulate greenhouse gas
emissions from the livestock industry, the EPA would not be barred
from enforcing the provisions of the CAA against CAFOs with regards to greenhouse gas emissions. Having established the EPA’s
authority under the CAA, this Note will now determine the most
effective provisions of the Act for regulating CAFOs in order to mitigate climate change.
III. CAA ENFORCEMENT IN PRACTICE
As emitters of greenhouse gases, CAFOs could fall under the
CAA’s stationary source regulations. Under these regulations, mitigating greenhouse gas emissions from CAFOs can be best achieved
via two portions of the Act: (1) emission-based standards through
the criteria pollutants provisions in sections 108 and 109 of the Act;

115

Animal Feeding Operations Consent Agreement and Final Order, supra
note 101, at 4958–4959.
116
The EPA defines VOCs as “any compound of carbon, excluding carbon
monoxide, carbon dioxide, carbonic acid, metallic carbides or carbonates, and
ammonium carbonate, which participates in atmospheric photochemical reactions,” except those designated by the EPA as having “negligible photochemical
reactivity.” 40 C.F.R. § 51.100(s)(1) (2018).
117
Animal Feeding Operations Consent Agreement and Final Order, supra
note 101, at 4963 (explicitly only including VOCs, hydrogen sulfide, particulate
matter, and ammonia in its definition of “Emission Unit”).
118
Id.
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and (2) individual source standards under the New Source Performance Standards (“NSPS”) of section 111.119 Section 112 of the
CAA, another stationary source regulation, is inapplicable to greenhouse gases because it empowers the EPA to regulate hazardous pollutants deemed “toxic.”120
Sections 108 and 109 set limits for acceptable pollutant concentrations in the air, while section 111 sets limits for those concentrations at individual stationary sources.121 However, section 111 offers
the most complete answer to the CAFO greenhouse gas emissions
problem because the EPA can reasonably read section 111(d) to apply broadly to both new and existing sources of greenhouse gases.
Sections 108 and 109 are trickier to apply to CAFOs because of their
reliance on regional concentrations of pollutants.122
A. Criteria Pollutant Provisions
Sections 108 and 109 of the CAA govern the National Ambient
Air Quality Standards (“NAAQS”), which specify the maximum
permissible concentration of an air pollutant in a region’s ambient
air.123 Once the EPA has created the required endangerment finding
for a pollutant, “there is no discretion provided by the statute not to
list the pollutant.”124 After the EPA sets a NAAQS limit, each state
develops State Implementation Plans (“SIPs”) detailing how the
state’s air quality control regions will comply with the standard.125

119

42 U.S.C. §§ 7408–7409, 7411 (2012).
Id. § 7412(b)(2) (listing established hazardous pollutants determined by
Congress and reviewed by the EPA administrator).
121
Id. §§ 7408–7409, 7411.
122
After the EPA revises National Ambient Air Quality Standards under sections 108 and 109 of the CAA, state and local governments are responsible for
developing and implementing plans to monitor air quality in their respective regions. Id. § 7410; see NAAQS Implementation Process, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION
AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/criteria-air-pollutants/naaqs-implementation-process (last visited Dec. 17, 2018). For an example of one of these plans, see Air
Plan Approval; Tennessee; NOx SIP Call and CAIR, 83 Fed. Reg. 64,497, 64,497
(proposed Dec. 17, 2018) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 52).
123
42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1)–(2).
124
Nat. Res. Def. Council v. Train, 411 F. Supp. 864, 868 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
125
42 U.S.C. § 7410.
120
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Some CAFO emissions are already regulated under sections 108
and 109; there is a NAAQS for particulate matter126 and the EPA
has the authority to regulate ammonia as a precursor to particulate
matter.127 NAAQS implementation works best for localized emissions because the permitting structure assesses ambient air locally
through air quality control regions.128 This presents problems for
greenhouse gas regulations because greenhouse gases disperse
throughout the globe upon release into the atmosphere. Greenhouse
gases are often classified as “‘well-mixed,’ meaning their concentration is similar around the world regardless of where the emissions
arise.”129 For this reason, regulating CAFO emissions of methane
and nitrous oxide under the NAAQS/SIPs program becomes problematic because in order to set a limit, there needs to be a quantifiable regional concentration.
Moreover, explicitly applying NAAQS to greenhouse gases is
an overreach of agency authority according to the Supreme Court in
Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA (“UARG”).130 In a 2010 regulation, the EPA attempted to explicitly apply NAAQS to greenhouse
gases. 131 The EPA planned to tailor its program based on specific
greenhouse gas emissions by adopting a “phase-in approach” that
would apply Prevention of Significant Deterioration (“PSD”) to
large industrial sources at greenhouse gas threshold levels that are
126

The most recent set of NAAQS for particulate matter was promulgated in
2013. Particulate Matter (PM) Standards – Table of Historical PM NAAQS, U.S.
ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, https://www3.epa.gov/ttn/naaqs/standards/pm
/s_pm_history.html (last visited Sept. 22, 2018); see National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Particulate Matter, 78 Fed. Reg. 3086, 3086 (Jan. 15, 2013) (to
be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts 50, 51, 52, 53 & 58).
127
J. Nicholas Hoover, Note, Can’t You Smell That Smell? Clean Air Act Fixes
for Factory Farm Air Pollution, 6 STAN. J. ANIMAL L. & POL’Y 1, 11 (2013).
128
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7407(d), 7410.
129
NAAQS May Help EPA Achieve Greenhouse Gas Reductions, Should
Clean Power Plan Not Survive Challenges, DUKE NICHOLAS INST. ENVTL. POL’Y
SOLUTIONS: NEWS (Jan. 5, 2017), https://nicholasinstitute.duke.edu/articles/naaqs
-may-help-epa-achieve-greenhouse-gas-reductions-should-clean-power-plannot-survive.
130
Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2445 (2014).
131
The regulation seeks to tailor “the applicability criteria that determine
which [greenhouse gas] . . . sources become subject to the [Prevention of Significant Deterioration] and title V programs of the CAA.” Prevention of Significant
Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 31,514,
31,516 (June 3, 2010).
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as “close to the [CAA’s] statutory levels as possible.”132 The PSD
program applies to areas that are in attainment of NAAQS in order
to ensure that new major sources or new modifications do not
worsen areas that currently have acceptable air quality.133
Despite the EPA believing the CAA was not “ambiguous with
respect to the need to cover [greenhouse gas] sources under the PSD
program,”134 UARG held that the agency had exceeded its reach under the CAA.135 According to the Court, while Massachusetts held
that the Act-wide definition of “air pollutant” includes greenhouse
gases, the term “air pollutant” in PSD permitting provisions has routinely been given a narrow, “context-appropriate” meaning.136 In
sum, Massachusetts does not override narrow definitions of “air pollutant” found in discrete provisions of the CAA.137 According to the
Court, the EPA cannot “treat greenhouse gases as a pollutant for
purposes of defining a ‘major emitting facility’”— such as a
CAFO—in the PSD context.138
Following UARG, in 2015, the D.C. Circuit issued an amended
decision in Coalition for Responsible Regulation v. EPA, which ordered the EPA’s proposed regulation vacated to the extent it requires
a stationary emitter to obtain a PSD permit if greenhouse gases are
the only pollutant.139 For CAFOs, this means greenhouse gas regulation under sections 108 and 109 is only possible for facilities large
enough to produce pollutants that would trigger NAAQS regulation
for particulate matter, volatile organic compounds, or other gases
explicitly covered.140 As operations become larger, it becomes more
132

Id. at 31,523.
40 C.F.R. § 52.21 (2018).
134
Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 31,548 n.31.
135
Util. Air Regulatory Grp., 143 S. Ct. at 2445.
136
Id. at 2439.
137
Id. at 2440–41.
138
Id. at 2449.
139
Coal. for Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. EPA, 606 F. App’x 6, 8 (D.C.
Cir. 2015).
140
As previously discussed, the EPA has already issued NAAQS for particulate matter, which CAFOs do emit. See National Ambient Air Quality Standards
for Particulate Matter, 78 Fed. Reg. 3086, 3086 (Jan. 15, 2013) (to be codified at
40 C.F.R. pts 50, 51, 52, 53 & 58). Therefore, greenhouse gas regulation of CAFO
emissions is possible for facilities large enough to trigger particulate matter
NAAQS.
133
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likely that some operations meet the emission thresholds for major
sources. Regardless, seeking to regulate CAFOs’ greenhouse gas
emissions through this provision could only occur indirectly and is
thus not necessarily the ideal method for mitigating emissions.
B. New and Existing Source Performance Standards
The second regulatory pathway for CAFOs under the CAA focuses on individual sources of emissions. Under section 111 of the
CAA, the EPA may regulate the various pollutants emitted from a
single source category.141 When listing a category, the EPA must
make an endangerment finding142 and then promulgate performance
standards for new sources in the category.143 These performance
standards, unlike NAAQS, are not pollutant specific, but category
specific.144 The EPA has broad power to define and revise source
categories of pollution and has listed a large number of such categories in the Code of Federal Regulations.145 Unfortunately, CAFOs
have not yet been listed.146
Section 111’s New Source Performance Standards (“NSPS”)
cap the level of achievable emissions by the best system of emission
reduction (“BSER”) for all regulated pollutants as determined by the
EPA administrator.147 Following an identification of the BSER, the
Agency must then set performance standards, usually expressed as
emission rates based on the emissions performance the EPA believes can be achieved through application of its identified system.148 The performance standard determines the stringency of the
141

42 U.S.C. § 7411(b)(1)(B) (2012) (indicating that sources are to be regulated, not pollutants).
142
Id. § 7411(b)(1)(A) (“[The Administrator] shall include a category of
sources in such list if in his judgement it causes, or contributes significantly to,
air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or
welfare.”).
143
Id. § 7411(b)(1)(B).
144
See id. (“The Administrator shall publish proposed regulations, establishing Federal standards of performance for new sources within such category.”).
145
40 C.F.R. pt. 60 (2018) (including emission guidelines for Large Municipal
Waste Combustors, Municipal Solid Waste Landfills, Infectious Waste Incinerators, etc.).
146
Id.; see infra Section III.C.
147
42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1).
148
See id. § 7411(a), (d); see also Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for
Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg.
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regulation.149 However, as clarified by section 111(b)(5), “nothing
in this section shall be construed to require . . . any . . . source to
install and operate any particular technological system . . . to comply
with any new source standard of performance.”150 This offers a tremendous amount of flexibility to regulated entities, who are free to
adopt any measure so long as they meet emission standards.
Section 111(b) was issued as a NSPS, generally implying that
existing, unmodified stationary emission sources are not subject to
performance standards under this section.151 While being constructed, these unmodified sources must comply with NSPS but are
not required to meet future performance standards.152 This is the
case because many emissions from existing sources are regulated by
the NAAQS programs in sections 108 and 109, or the hazardous air
pollutant program in section 112 of the CAA. However, not every
air pollutant is either a criteria pollutant with corresponding
NAAQS or hazardous pollutants subject to compliance with section
112. For such pollutants, section 111(d) of the CAA provides a
mechanism for implementing existing emissions performance
standards (“ESPS”).153
Section 111(d) has only very rarely been used, largely because
there are few pollutants with significant health or welfare impacts
that have not been regulated under NAAQS or section 112.154 However, greenhouse gases conveniently fall into this regulatory gap.
Under section 111(d), the EPA can require states to submit plans for
establishing, implementing, and enforcing standards for existing
64,662, 64,664 n.1 (Oct. 23, 2015) (to be codified in 40 C.F.R. pt. 60) (“Under
CAA section 111(a)(1) and (d), the EPA is authorized to determine the BSER and
to calculate the amount of emission reduction achievable through applying the
BSER.”).
149
See 42 U.S.C. § 7411(b)(1)(B).
150
Id. § 7411(b)(5).
151
Id. § 7411(b)(6) (“Any new or modified fossil fuel fired stationary source
which commences construction prior to the date of publication of the proposed
revised standards shall not be required to comply with such revised standards.”).
152
Id.
153
Id. § 7411(d).
154
Robert R. Nordhaus & Ilan W. Gutherz, Regulation of CO2 Emissions from
Existing Power Plants Under § 111(d) of the Clean Air Act: Program Design &
Statutory Authority, 44 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,366, 10,372–73 (2014) (noting that criteria and toxic pollutants are “two categories that encompass the vast majority of
known air pollutants”).
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sources, provided that the pollutants already have a standard of performance for new stationary sources and are not covered by any
other provision of the CAA.155 Prior to approving a state’s plan, the
agency must set national goals that each individual state’s plan must
achieve.156 The EPA essentially indicates the substantive guidelines
for state plans, which effectively set the minimum stringency of the
ESPS.157
The EPA’s authority to regulate greenhouse gases under 111(d),
however, has come under scrutiny with opponents claiming it as an
overreach of agency power.158 Thus far, the EPA’s only effort to
regulate greenhouse gas emissions under the ESPS program is reflected in its proposed rules for power plants, which would create a
new source performance standard for carbon dioxide emissions for
coal-fired power facilities.159 This is most notably seen in the
Obama Administration’s Clean Power Plan. Obama’s EPA, through
the Clean Power Plan, sought to establish state-specific emission
rate-based goals that would be implemented under section 111(d) to
curb carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuel burning plants.160
A close reading of section 111(d) indicates that the “any existing
source for any air pollutant” language of the provision can be read
155

42 U.S.C. § 7411(d)(1).
Id.
157
See 40 C.F.R. §§ 60.22–.23 (2018).
158
See William Yeatman, Primer: The Ongoing Controversy over Whether
Clean Air Act §111(d) Authorizes EPA’s Clean Power Plan, GLOBALWARMING.ORG (July 2, 2014), www.globalwarming.org/2014/07/02/primer-the-ongoing-controversy-over-whether-clean-air-act-§111d-authorizes-epas-clean-powerplan/ (arguing that House version of 1990 CAA section 111(d) amendment controls and that it precludes the EPA from regulating hazardous air pollutant sources,
not just pollutants, under section 111(d)).
159
See, e.g., Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary
Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662 (Oct. 23, 2015)
(to be codified in 40 C.F.R. pt. 60); Carbon Pollution Standards for Modified and
Reconstructed Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 79 Fed. Reg.
34,960 (proposed June 18, 2014) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60); Standards of
Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions From New Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 79 Fed. Reg. 1430 (proposed Jan. 8, 2014) (to be
codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 60, 70, 71, & 98).
160
See Fact Sheet: Clean Power Plan Overview, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION
AGENCY,
https://archive.epa.gov/epa/cleanpowerplan/fact-sheet-clean-powerplan-overview.html (last visited Dec. 31, 2018) (noting that the Clean Power Plan
is flexible: “reflecting the different needs of different states”).
156
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to include greenhouse gases, evading potential problems created by
the Court’s decision in UARG.161 Recall that the Court in UARG did
not accept the broad definition of “pollutant” settled in Massachusetts,162 which included greenhouse gases.163 Instead, UARG decided the definition of “pollutant” should be determined based on
the context of the specific section at issue.164 Nevertheless, a contextual reading of the language in section 111(d) favors the broad
application of “pollutant” offered in Massachusetts.
Section 111(d) states that the EPA may regulate “any existing
source of any air pollutant” so long as it is not already regulated
under sections 108, 109, or 112 and could be regulated as a new
source under section 111(b).165 There is no pollutant-specific restriction, unlike in the PSD context where the EPA’s regulations
have interpreted air pollutant as limited to “regulated” air pollutants.166 Section 111(d) is merely limited by its statutory language
which is still broad: pollutants must already have a standard of performance for new stationary sources and must not be covered by any
other provision of the CAA.167
Ultimately, courts will likely uphold the EPA’s current interpretation of section 111(d), which supports the regulation of greenhouse gas emissions from source categories. The categorization is
unlikely to dramatically expand agency authority because section
111(d) gives states and regulated parties the flexibility to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions based on their individual infrastructure.168
Utilizing the regulatory options under section 111(d) would drastically help climate mitigation efforts, specifically when utilized to
enforce emissions from the animal agriculture industry.
161

42 U.S.C. § 7411(d)(1)(2012).
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 555–56 (2007) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(criticizing the majority’s reliance on the CAA’s “capacious definition of ‘air pollutant’”).
163
Id. at 528–29 (majority opinion).
164
Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 143 S. Ct. 2427, 2439 (2014).
165
42 U.S.C. § 7411(d).
166
Util. Air Regulatory Grp., 143 S. Ct. at 2440; 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(a)(2),
(b)(1) (2018).
167
42 U.S.C. § 7411(d).
168
See Letter from Thomas Carbonell, Envtl. Def. Fund Dir. of Regulatory
Policy, to Journalist (2015), https://www.edf.org/sites/default/files/content/cleanpowerplan_strong_legal_foundation.pdf; Fact Sheet: Clean Power Plan Overview, supra note 160.
162
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Regulating CAFOs under section 111(b) and (d) would give the
CAA maximum regulatory effect because it would allow the regulation of both existing and new sources of greenhouse gas pollution
directly. The EPA’s regulatory authority here is distinct from its
power under sections 108 and 109 of the CAA, which in practice
only allows regulation of a CAFO’s greenhouse gas emissions if the
facility is already in need of permits for other emissions. 169 Additionally, enforcing compliance of emission standards under sections
111(b) and (d) have the potential to create sufficient incentives to
alter harmful livestock industry practices.
C. Applying Section 111 to CAFOs
As an initial matter, the EPA must list CAFOs as a category of
sources under section 111(b) and (d) in order for the standards to
apply. Section 111(b) empowers the EPA to specify categories of
stationary emissions sources that “cause[], or contribute[] significantly to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.”170 As previously explained, the
statutory test is whether the group of sources emits air pollutants
that endanger health or welfare. The EPA has broad discretion to
determine and revise these “source categories.”171 The Agency lists
the categories in the Code of Federal Regulations, covering sources
in most major industrial sectors of the economy.172 While non-profit
organizations have petitioned for CAFO inclusion, unfortunately,
the EPA has not yet listed CAFOs as a source category under section
111.173 It remains difficult to assess the likelihood of Agency action
169

See Util. Air Regulatory Grp., 134 S. Ct. at 2445; Coal. for Responsible
Regulation, Inc. v. EPA, 606 F. App’x 6, 8 (D. C. Cir. 2015).
170
42 U.S.C. § 7411(b)(1)(A).
171
See id.
172
See 40 C.F.R. pt. 60 (2018) (including emission guidelines for Large Municipal Waste Combustors, Municipal Solid Waste Landfills, Infectious Waste Incinerators, etc.).
173
Humane Soc’y of the United States et al., Petition to List Concentrated
Animal Feeding Operations Under Clean Air Act Section 111(b)(1)(A) of the
Clean Air Act, and to Promulgate Standards for Performance Under Clean Air
Act Sections 111(b)(1)(B) and 111(d) at 3 (Sept. 21, 2009), http://www.humane
society.org/assets/pdfs/litigation/hsus-et-al-v-epa-cafo-caa-petition.pdf [hereinafter Petition to List Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations]; see infra Section
IV.C.1.
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because section 111 does not require listing a source category.174
Nevertheless, as this subsection explains, making CAFOs regulated
entities under the provision would improve public welfare and mitigate climate change by affecting industry manure management policies, thus supporting a listing.
1. THE LIKELIHOOD OF AGENCY ACTION
Determining the probability of the EPA listing CAFOs as a categorical source under section 111 of the CAA is difficult because
the Agency retains broad discretion to identify a source through an
endangerment finding.175 Despite this uncertainty, the EPA should
list CAFOs as a regulated category under section 111 not only because methane and nitrous oxide emissions endanger public health
and welfare, but also because similar sources are already regulated.
The list of regulated entities is diverse: the Code of Federal Regulations contains over ninety separate standards of performance covering sectors from “Large Municipal Waste Combustors” to “Existing
Sewage Sludge Incineration Units.”176 Particularly compelling here
are the standards of performance and emission guidelines for municipal waste landfills.177 Although admittedly animal agriculture
and waste landfills are distinct facilities, the source of emissions
from these two entities are in fact analogous.
Similar to municipal waste centers, CAFOs emit dangerously
large amounts of methane and nitrous oxide as a result of their waste
management systems.178 In fact, one dairy farm with 2,500 cows
produces as much waste as a city with around 411,000 residents.179
Although as an industry CAFOs serve a distinct function to waste
centers, both facilities endanger public health and the environment
through the emissions of greenhouse gases as a result of biological

174

See 42 U.S.C. § 7411(b)(1)(A).
Section 111(b) states that “the Administrator shall . . . publish (and from
time to time thereafter shall revise) a list of categories of stationary sources;”
therefore, there are no statutory constraints on the EPA’s authority to identify and
list sources. See id.
176
See 40 C.F.R. pt. 60.
177
Id. § 60.30c–.36c.
178
See Lehner & Rosenberg, supra note 8, at 10,855.
179
BARTH ET AL., supra note 29, at 7.
175
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waste.180 Consequently, similar to municipal waste facilities,
CAFOs should also be listed as a source category under section 111.
While the EPA has broad discretion to revise and add sources,
citizen groups are empowered to propose a listing and compel
agency action. In 2009, the Humane Society of the United States,
along with several environmental organizations, petitioned the EPA
to add CAFOs to the list of sources regulated under sections 111(b)
and (d), on the grounds that they are stationary source emitters of
greenhouse gases, which cause, or contribute significantly to, air
pollution and can endanger public health and welfare.181 Furthermore, the groups asserted that regulation of CAFO emissions was
effective, reasonable, and would ensure the use of new technologies
for mitigation efforts.182
After the EPA failed to acknowledge the petition, the groups
filed a federal lawsuit compelling response by the Agency.183 In
2016, the District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed the
suit on purely procedural grounds due to lack of jurisdiction.184 The
court found jurisdiction arose under the CAA,185 rather than the Administrative Procedure Act,186 and the advocacy group plaintiffs
failed to meet the CAA’s notice requirements.187 Decidedly, the
court did not conclude that listing CAFOs as a category source under
the CAA was unlawful; the court’s decision rested entirely on procedural inadequacies, rather than a judgment based on the merits.188
Essentially, the court did not state that listing CAFOs would be unreasonable or an overreach of agency authority. Therefore, this case
should not deter further petitions issued by advocacy groups, nor
should it discourage a direct listing by the EPA.
180

See Sources of Greenhouse Gas Emissions: Commercial/Residential, U.S.
ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/sources-green
house-gas-emissions#commercial-and-residential (last visited Jan. 2, 2019).
181
Petition to List Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations, supra note 173,
at 3.
182
Id. at 63–67.
183
Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Humane Soc’y of the
United States v. McCarthy, 209 F. Supp. 3d 280 (D.D.C. 2016) (No. 15-cv-0141).
184
Humane Soc’y of the United States, 209 F. Supp. 3d at 286.
185
42 U.S.C. § 7401 (2012).
186
5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012).
187
Humane Soc’y of the United States, 209 F. Supp. 3d at 286–88.
188
Id.
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Unfortunately, the EPA rejected the petition at the end of 2017,
claiming a need for “more accurate methodologies for estimating
[CAFO air] emissions.”189 In its letter to petitioners, the Agency explained that once it “has sufficient information on CAFO emissions,
it will determine the appropriate regulatory approach to address
those emissions.”190 The EPA’s alleged need for additional information seems suspicious, as the Agency has supposedly been monitoring CAFO emissions since 2005.191 Continued pressure from advocacy groups could compel the EPA to conclude its study of
CAFOs and finally list animal agriculture facilities as source categories under the CAA.
2. EXTERNAL SUPPORT FOR LISTING CAFOS
Additionally, the policy implications of regulating the animal
agriculture sector under section 111 encourages listing CAFOs as a
category source of air pollutants. Section 111 offers the most effective answer to the CAFO greenhouse gas emissions problem because it allows for direct regulation of these animal agriculture facilities. The definition of performance standards under section 111
is exceptionally broad as it permits the EPA to consider “nonair
quality health and environmental impact” in setting standards.192
Further, the provision allows the EPA to “distinguish among classes,
types, and sizes within categories of new sources for the purpose of
establishing such standards.”193 Thus, in setting national goals for
CAFO greenhouse gas emissions, the Agency can still customize its
standards to the diversity of CAFO facilities—which vary in size
and type.194
Further, under section 111 all CAFOs would be regulated uniformly as a source category, thus establishing a national threshold

189
Letter from E. Scott Pruitt, Adm’r, Envtl. Prot. Agency, to Jonathan Lovvorn & Daneil Lutz, The Humane Soc’y of the United States at 3 (Dec. 15, 2017),
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=EPA-HQ-OAR-2017-0638-0003
(follow link titled “View Document”).
190
Id. at 4.
191
See Animal Feeding Operations Consent Agreement and Final Order, supra note 101.
192
42 U.S.C. at § 7411(a)(1)(2012).
193
Id. § 7411(b)(2).
194
See 40 C.F.R. §§ 122.23, 122.42 (2018).
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standard of emissions.195 As mentioned previously, under section
111(b)(5) the EPA cannot force a specific industry technology system;196 however, CAFOs would still be subject to uniform emission
standards established by the provision.197 Moreover, the standards
implemented under section 111 could require specific work practices if certain emissions would be too difficult to measure—as has
been done in coal processing plants. 198 Because the bulk of CAFO
methane and nitrous oxide emissions derive from concentrated manure and enteric fermentation,199 work practice regulations—or even
traditional emission standards under section 111(d)—would force
CAFOs to confront their waste management policies.
3. ADJUSTING THE CAFO MODEL
If the EPA listed CAFOs as a source category under section
111(b) and (d)—in accordance with policy rationales described
above—new and existing CAFOs would have to alter their manure
management practices to diminish methane and nitrous oxide emissions. Ending the CAFO model entirely by moving animals out of
metal buildings and onto grazing lands is a potential industry policy
choice. Liquid manure stored in anaerobic environments within lagoons release ninety percent (90%) more methane than solid manure
that decomposes aerobically in grazing systems.200 While pastureraised livestock may produce less methane, the grazing system is
195
Recall that because under section 111 standards are implemented against
source categories rather than specific pollutants, each listed category is regulated
uniformly depending on specified emission criteria for that source. See 40 C.F.R.
pt. 60.
196
42 U.S.C. § 7411(b)(5).
197
Id. § 7411(b). For examples of different emission criteria for various listed
categories see 40 C.F.R. pt. 60.
198
After finding it “difficult and prohibitively expensive to measure actual
[particulate matter] emissions from individual open storage [coal] piles or roadways,” the EPA implemented work practice standards for open storage piles of
coal, rather than emission limitations. Standards of Performance for Coal Preparation and Processing Plants, 74 Fed. Reg. 51,950, 51,950, 51,954 (Oct. 8, 2009)
(to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60).
199
See EPA INVENTORY, supra note 7, at ES-21, 5-1; Ripple et al., supra note
3, at 2–3.
200
Jun et al., supra note 34, at 322; see Lehner & Rosenberg, supra note 8, at
10,855 (“When manure is left as a solid . . . on . . . pasture land[], it typically
decomposes aerobically and produces little to no methane.”).
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resource intensive and often requires land-clearing and deforestation—both of which contribute significantly to climate change.201
Another potential solution, digesters, has emerged within the animal agriculture industry as a new technology to curb greenhouse
gas emissions from animal waste.202 Anaerobic digesters capture
methane from CAFO manure management systems and convert it to
biogas, a renewable energy source.203 Biogas—consisting of fifty to
seventy percent (50–70%) methane, can be used onsite to power
farms or it can be sold for use offsite.204 However, digesters are expensive and only possible financially by the largest CAFOs, therefore likely incentivizing the growth of CAFO facilities.205 Furthermore, digesters address only a portion of the methane emissions, and
none of the nitrous oxide emissions, resulting from livestock production.206 They also cannot alleviate enteric fermentation, caused
by the breathing and belching of ruminants, which represents a
much larger share of methane emissions than manure waste.207
Additionally, while this Note concerns the climate change impacts of CAFOs, these facilities do not exist in a vacuum and have

201

See, e.g., Paul West et al., Leverage Points for Improving Global Food
Security and the Environment, 345 SCI. 325, 326 (identifying Brazil and Indonesia
as agents for reducing agriculture’s impact on climate change through tropical
deforestation).
202
See THE WHITE HOUSE, CLIMATE ACTION PLAN – STRATEGY TO REDUCE
METHANE EMISSIONS 6–7 (2014), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/
default/files/strategy_to_reduce_methane_emissions_2014-03-28_final.pdf.
203
Id. at 6 (“Biogas systems are proven and effective technology to process
organic waste and generate renewable energy.”).
204
Id. at 7 (“The Dairy Power project report findings show a $3 billion market
potential through the products and co-products developed by mature digester systems that process manure and commercial food waste, with additional value for
potential nutrient trading markets . . . .”).
205
See Nicole G. Di Camillo, Comment, Methane Digesters and Biogas Recovery––Masking the Environmental Consequences of Industrial Concentrated
Livestock Production, 29 UCLA J. ENVTL. L & POL’Y 365, 375–78 (2011).
206
See id. at 374–75 (critiquing methane digesters as an expensive, and at best,
partial solution to CAFO greenhouse gas emissions).
207
See id. at 372–73, 378–79 (explaining that bio-digesters are meant to mitigate emissions from manure, rather than other biological processes, and that enteric digestion produces the majority of methane emissions related to livestock
production).
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created considerable externalities that digesters are incapable of addressing: harm to animal welfare,208 antibiotic resistance,209 and air
and water pollution for surrounding, predominately low-income
communities of color.210 Thus, digesters, appearing facially beneficial in the climate change mitigation context, potentially distract
from other impacts of CAFOs.211 Nevertheless, although a partially
deficient solution, digesters would ameliorate greenhouse gas emissions from CAFOs more than maintaining the status quo. Further,
digesters would presumably appeal to industry because adding the
technology is theoretically simpler than readjusting CAFOs completely towards a grazing model.
It is worth noting that decreasing the size of CAFOs by limiting
the number of animals per facility or the quantity of CAFOs nationally would decrease the amount of waste and enteric fermentation
produced—thus simply diminishing methane and nitrous oxide
emissions in accordance with a section 111 regulation. This policy
choice, however, depends on consumer preferences for animal products. Meat consumption continues to rise in the United States,212
caused by industry oversupply and agriculture subsidies provided by
taxpayer dollars that incentivize consumption.213 Consumer preferences for plant-based diets, as opposed to those heavy in meat and
dairy products, would amplify section 111 regulations by diminishing the demand for CAFOs. Ultimately, this policy action relies on
educating the public about the environmental harms and public welfare externalities created by animal agriculture.214

208

See Walton & Jaiven, supra note 23, at 93.
Tillman et al., supra note 24, at 674.
210
See, e.g., Levine, supra note 25; Wing & Wolf, supra note 25, at 235–37.
211
See Di Camillo, supra note 205, at 375–80.
212
Zlati Meyer, Beef Is Back on the Grill and Its Sales Are Heating Up, Too,
USA TODAY (July 3, 2017, 11:48 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money
/2017/07/03/americans-eat-more-beef-and-meat-trend-thats-expected-continue/435331001/.
213
Marya Torrez, Accounting for Taste: Trade Law Implications of Taxing
Meat to Fight Climate Change, 27 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 61, 63 (2014) (explaining that the subsidization of animal agriculture “creates a perverse incentive
for individuals to over-consume animal products at great cost not only to the environment but also to human health . . .”).
214
In 2015, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (“USDA”) and the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) considered incorporating sus209
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4. THE FEASIBILITY OF A NATIONAL STANDARD TODAY
Establishing a national standard for CAFOs under section 111(b)
and (d) is an effective use of the existing CAA framework because
it would allow the regulation of both existing and new sources of
greenhouse gas pollution directly. However, under President
Trump’s administration—which has proposed a repeal of the Obama
administration’s Clean Power Plan—expecting the EPA to take action against the powerful agriculture sector seems naively optimistic.215 Recall that, historically, agricultural exceptionalism has led
policymakers to concede to agricultural interest against competing
environmental concerns.216
In light of these circumstances, it is necessary to use legislation
at the state and local levels in order to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from CAFOs, even if only incrementally. Several states have
sought to curb agricultural impacts on climate change by passing
laws or initiatives in support of soil carbon sequestration, which
aims to decrease the amount of methane and other carbon-based
greenhouse gases.217 While most of these programs address climate
tainability concerns in their dietary guidelines. BARBARA E. MILLEN ET AL., SCIENTIFIC REPORT OF THE 2015 DIETARY GUIDELINES ADVISORY COMMITTEE, at
Part D. Chapter 5 (2015). Although USDA and HHS rejected the inclusion of sustainability issues in the final guideline, it remains increasingly important to educate the public about the tangible environmental impacts of their food choices.
See Allison Aubrey, New Dietary Guidelines Will Not Include Sustainability
Goal, NPR (Oct. 6, 2015, 6:16 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thesalt/2015/
10/06/446369955/new-dietary-guidelines-will-not-include-sustainability-goal.
215
See Lisa Friedman & Brad Plumer, E.P.A. Announces Repeal of Major
Obama-Era Carbon Emissions Rule, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 9, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/09/climate/clean-power-plan.html; see also Nadja Popovich
& Tatiana Schlossberg, 23 Environmental Rules Rolled Back in Trump’s First 100
Days, N.Y. TIMES (May 2, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/05
/02/climate/environmental-rules-reversed-trump-100-days.html.
216
Foscolo & Zimmerman, supra note 93, at 317; see supra Section II.C.
217
Hawaii House Bill 1578 establishes the Carbon Farming Task Force to
identify agricultural practices to promote carbon sequestration. H.B. 1578, 29th
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2017). Minnesota passed a law in 2015 requiring permanent vegetative buffers on farmland bordering lakes and streams, which will increase soil carbon sequestration in addition to decreasing pollutant run-off. 2015
Minn. Laws 1st Spec. Sess. Ch. 4 (S.F. 5) (codified as amended in scattered sections of MINN. STAT. chs. 103A–114b (2018)). The Oklahoma Carbon Sequestration Enhancement Act quantifies carbon sequestration in order to market emissions in the future. OKLA. STAT. tit. 27A § 27A-3-4-101 (2019).
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implications from farming and agricultural practices generally, California’s State Legislature specifically directed its Air Resources
Board to reduce methane emissions from dairy farms through strict
emission standards.218
CONCLUSION
Emissions from both enteric fermentation and manure, a result
of intensive factory farms known as CAFOs,219 must be regulated
under a national framework in order to properly mitigate the United
States’s contribution to climate change. Setting national standards—
as opposed to relying exclusively on state action—would allow an
industry wide compliance and prevent CAFOs from concentrating
in states with lenient regulations.
Relying on the existing CAA framework is essential as no formalized regulations exist specifically addressing CAFO emissions
of methane and nitrous oxide.220 The EPA is empowered to regulate
greenhouse gases under the CAA and can address emissions from
CAFOs under stationary source provisions in sections 108, 109, and
111 of the Act.221 Section 111 performance standards, unlike those
in sections 108 and 109, are category specific rather than pollutant
specific.222 Further, regulating CAFOs under section 111 is more efficient and effective because it permits the direct oversight of both
existing and new sources of methane and nitrous oxide emissions.223
The EPA’s regulatory authority here is distinct from its power under
sections 108 and 109, which only allow regulation of a CAFO’s
greenhouse gas emissions if the facility needs permits for other pollutants.224
For section 111 to apply, the EPA must list CAFOs as a source
category—which it has not yet done despite petitions from citizen
218

CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 39730 (West 2018); AIR RES. BD., CAL.
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, SHORT-LIVED CLIMATE POLLUTANT REDUCTION STRATEGY 7–8 (2017).
219
NPDES for CAFOs, supra note 11; see also Animal Feeding Operations,
supra note 11.
220
AIR QUALITY ISSUES, supra note 15, at 3.
221
42 U.S.C. §§ 7408, 7409, 7411 (2012).
222
See id. § 7411(b)(1)(B).
223
See id. § 7411(b), (d).
224
See Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2445 (2014); Coal.
for Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. EPA, 606 F. App’x 6, 8 (D. C. Cir. 2015).
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groups.225 The likelihood of the EPA listing CAFOs as a source is
uncertain because the Agency has broad discretion to revise its categorizations.226 Despite this uncertainty, the EPA should list CAFOs
as a category because similar sources are regulated—such as municipal waste centers.227 Moreover, making CAFOs regulated entities
under the provision would improve public welfare and mitigate climate change by affecting industry manure management policies—
thus supporting a listing.
In assessing their waste storage policies, the livestock sector
could adopt several potential solutions: (1) end the CAFO model
entirely by raising only grass-fed animals, although this raises climate change concerns as a result of the necessary land-clearing;228
(2) utilize methane digesters, which do not address methane and nitrous oxide emissions from enteric fermentation;229 or (3) decrease
operation size, which would only be viable from the industry’s perspective if the public demanded less meat and dairy products.
Adopting methane digesters is the most likely outcome, as it presumably presents the least damage to the agriculture industry from
the solutions presented. Albeit an incomplete answer, digesters
would at least address some of CAFOs’ climate change impacts.
Climate change is the defining challenge of our time. However,
it remains politically divisive. While substantive legal reform addressing CAFOs impact on climate change at the federal level is potentially only distantly achievable, it is necessary to confront this
issue in the hopes of proper mitigation.
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